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found in earlier commercial speech cases, it nonetheless threatens traditionally
protected speech. When different standards are applied to two varieties of
speech subject to differentiation only by a resort to "commonsense", there exists
a real danger that leveling will occur. 96 Therefore, the relatively minor benefits
conferred on consumers by recent commercial speech cases do not justify the
jeopardy in which the precious right of free speech has been placed by the
9

reasoning of these decisions.

7

JONATHAN

J. FLEucnAus

THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND THE STATES:
COMMERCE CLAUSE OR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT?
Pearcev. Wichita County Hospital Board, 590 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1979)
Appellee' sought damages from appellant state hospital 2 under the Equal
Pay Act, 3 alleging pay discrimination on the basis of sex. 4 The hospital con96. The principal danger is that the content-oriented approach employed in commercial
speech cases, discussed in notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text, will infiltrate traditional
first amendment analysis. This has apparently already occurred in a recent decision by the
Court. "Even within the area of protected speech, a difference in content may require a different governmental response." Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976).
97. That this risk is not imaginary can be seen in the words of Judge Frank, dissenting
from the appellate court's protection of Chrestensen's handbill. "I can find neither reason
nor authority for such an extension. So to amplify the constitutional guaranty would be to
'thingify' the words 'free speech' and 'free expression,' and to become forgetful of the vital
ideas- 'the defense of liberty' and the functioning of 'the processes of popular rule'- for
which they stand. The danger of converting words into thought-paralyzing entities is illustrated by the judicial history of the phrase 'liberty of contract.'" Chrestensen v. Valentine,
122 F.2d 511, 525 (2d Cir. 1941) (Frank, J., dissenting).
1. Mrs. Pearce had standing to sue the state as an individual under 29 U.S.C. §216(b)
(1976). This subsection provided for suits against public agency employers as part of the Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§201-219 (1976)). For a discussion of individual suits against state governments under federal legislation, see Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. Rxv. 682
(1976).
2. Pearce v. Wichita County Hosp. Bd., 590 F.2d 128, 130 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979). The
hospital was jointly funded by the city and county under TEx. Rlv. Civ. STAT. art. 4494i-I
(1976). 590 F.2d at 130 n.l.
3. 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (1976). The statute provides in part: "No employers having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate within any establishment
in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages
to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility." See generally Murphy, Female Wage
Discrimination:A Study of the Equal Pay Act, 1963-1970, 39 U. CIN. L,. REv. 615 (1970); Note,
Labor Law - The Equal Pay Act of 1963 - Problems In Upholding the Standard For Female
Employees, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 409 (1973).
4. 590 F.2d at 130-31. Mrs. Pearce was the hospital's credit manager. Evidence was introduced showing that she was paid substantially less than male credit managers who preceded
and followed her in the same position. Id.
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tended that application of the Equal Pay Act to the states as employers interfered with state freedom to act in areas traditionally considered sovereign functions.5 The district court awarded damages 6 and found the Act constitutionally
permissible.7 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and
HELD, the Equal Pay Act may be applied to the states as 9employers under the
commerce clause" without violating the tenth amendment.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 193810 [FLSA] was enacted to prevent the
disruption of interstate commerce by labor conditions detrimental to the
health and well being of employees. 1' It originally consisted of minimum wage
5. Id. at 131. Appellant argued that health care, along with fire protection, police protection, sanitation and public recreation is an essential function of state government reserved to
the states by the tenth amendment. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851
(1976). See text accompanying notes 27-37 infra.
6. 590 F.2d at 131. The trial court awarded Mrs. Pearce $7460 in actual damages, liquidated damages in the same amount, and attorney's fees of $4500 under the penalties provision
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (1976). 590 F.2d at 131.
7. 590 F.2d at 131. The district court's decision was not published.

8. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, §8, cd. 3. Chief Justice Marshall found the commerce clause to be a
grant of plenary power limited only by other constitutional provisions. Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (state law in conflict with federal law regulating interstate steamship operation found unconstitutional). In recent decades, the Court has upheld congressional
action under the commerce clause regulating almost any activity remotely connected with
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) (prohibition of racial discrimination in motel serving interstate travelers); Katzenback
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (prohibition of racial discrimination in restaurant where
food was obtained in interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937) (unfair labor practices affecting commerce within power of commerce clause). The
tenth amendment has often been proposed as a basis for state sovereignty rights in opposition
to Congress' commerce power. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (federal law prohibiting interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor unconstitutional)
(overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941) (minimum wage and overtime provisions of FLSA of 1938 constitutional as applied to manufacturers of goods shipped
in interstate commerce)). See also Note, Federalism and Federal Regulation of Public Employees: The Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 CrEv. ST. L. REV. 257,
273-76 (1977).
9. 590 F.2d at 132. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONsr. amend. X.
10. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § §201-219 (1976)).
11. Section 202 of the FLSA provides: "(a) The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and
instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions
among the workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in
commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and
(5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce. That Congress further
finds that the employment of persons in domestic service in households affects commerce.
(b) It is declared to be the policy of this chapter, through the exercise by Congress of its
power to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, to correct and
as rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above referred to in such industries
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and overtime regulations.12 In 1963, however, Congress expanded the FLSA to
include the Equal Pay Act, which prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of
sex.' 3 Although the two acts utilize the same definitions and enforcement procedures, 14 the FLSA contains a severability clause which provides that the
invalidation of one provision will not affect the others. 15
Both the FLSA and the Equal Pay Act focus upon the obligations of employers. Originally, the FLSA defined employer as meaning only private employers.' 6 In 1966 Congress extended this definition to include public schools,
hospitals and transit systems. 17 Despite contentions that regulation of such
public employers violated state sovereignty under the tenth amendment, the
Supreme Court, in Maryland v. Wirtz,18 upheld the Act's extension. 9 The
Court's holding was predicated upon a determination that labor conditions in
schools and hospitals affect interstate commerce. 20 Further, in rejecting state
sovereignty as a basis for the nonapplicability of the Act the Court reasoned
that minimum wage and overtime provisions do not interfere with state reguwithout substantially curtailing employment or earning power." 29 U.S.C. §202 (1976).
12. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§206-207 (1976)).
13. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §206(d)
(1976)). See note 2 supra.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§203, 216-217 (1976). The Equal Pay Act was incorporated into the FLSA
for reasons of administrative convenience in utilizing the same definitions and enforcement
procedures. H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 687, 688.
15. 29 U.S.C. §219 (1976) provides that: "If any provision of this chapter or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this
chapter and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby." For a discussion of the effectiveness of an identical severability clause, see
Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 434 (1938) (registration and registration
enforcement provisions of Public Utility Act of 1935 may be severed from rest of Act for
purpose of establishing their validity, while xeserving decision on validity of remainder of
Act).
16. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, §3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (current
amended version at 29 U.S.C. §203(d) (1976)). This definition provided: "'Employer' includes
any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State,

or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization." Id.
17. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601 §102(b), 80 Stat. 830
(amending 29 U.S.C. §203(d) (1966)). The amended version provided that: "'Employer' indudes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee but shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a
State (except with respect to employees of a State, or a political subdivision thereof, employed (1) in a hospital, institution, or school . . . or (2) in the operation of a railway or
carrier ... )." Id.
18. 292 U.S. 183 (1968). Twenty eight states and a school district sought to enjoin the
application of the FLSA to state operated schools or hospitals. Id. at 187.
19. Id. at 201. Petitioners argued additionally that the remedial provisions, by allowing
suits against the states, violated the eleventh amendment. Id. at 187.
20. Id. at 194. The Court noted the district court's finding that 87% of the Maryland
school system's equipment and supply budget involved direct interstate purchases. Similar
findings were made concerning schools and hospitals in other states. Id.
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lation of health care and educational services. Accordingly, the court found no
impermissible interference with sovereign state functions.2 '
In Fry v. United States, 22 the Supreme Court sustained another.congressional
regulation of state employment policy. State officials in Fry claimed that legislation limiting wage increases for state employees 23 violated the tenth amendment
because it interfered with sovereign state functions. Finding the legislation
narrowly limited in effect on state functions, the Supreme Court held these
wage limitations to be within the commerce power.24 Therefore, the legislation
25
was not an impermissible infringement upon state sovereignty.
In 1974, Congress expansively amended the FLSA to include virtually all
public agency employees. 26 This extension subjected state and local governments to the same wage and overtime regulations that were previously applied
to private employers.2 7 In National League of Cities v. Usery,2s state and local
employers sought to bar implementation of the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the FLSA to their police and fire departments. 29 The Supreme
Court held that the challenged amendments to the FLSA violated the tenth
amendment since they "directly displace[d] the states' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 30 The
NationalLeague of Cities Court expressly overruled Wirtz,2 ' and distinguished
21. Id. at 192-93.

22. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
23. Id. at 543-44. The wage controls were part of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (expired 1974), and intended to control inflation by
temporarily freezing all wages and salaries including those of state and local employees. After
the issuance of regulations under the Act limiting annual salary increases to 5.5%, Ohio
passed raises of 10.6% for 65,000 state employees. 421 U.S. at 544.
24. 421 U.S. at 547-48. The appellant state officials did not dispute that unrestrained wage
increases for state employees could significantly affect commerce. Since the state legislation
dearly conflicted with federal regulations promulgated under a power specifically granted by
the Constitution, the supremacy clause governed and the state was forced to yield to the
federal mandate. Id.

25. Id. at 547-48 n.7.
26. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, §6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55
(amending 29 U.S.C. §203(d) (1970)). This amendment provided: "'Employer' includes any
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee
and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other than when
acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization." Id. Public office holders, their personal staff and advisors and policymaking
appointees were excluded from coverage. 29 U.S.C. §203(e)(2)(C) (1976).
27. 29 U.S.C. §§203, 206-207 (1976).
28. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4 decision).
29. Id. at 836-37.
30. Id. at 852. Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, noted that fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health and parks and recreation are traditional governmental
functions. Id. The public health function implicated in the instant case would thus be considered a traditional area of state concern. For a proposed definition of traditional governmental functions, see Comment, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local Governments:
The Effect of NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 665, 672-76 (1977).
31. 426 U.S. at 855. The Court held that the schools and hospitals regulated in Wirtz
were also traditional state services and, therefore, application of the minimum wage and
overtime provisions to them would be unconstitutional. Id.
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Fry,s 2 observing that the temporary restriction on wage increases in Fry placed
no financial burden on the states. 3 The challenged minimum wage and overtime regulations of the FLSA would, however, alter budgets, restructure state
employment practices and force cutbacks in essential state services. 34 The
imposition of these regulations thus substantially reduced the states' fiscal selfcontrol. Moreover, the regulations could conceivably prevent the states from
36
providing those services3 5 which justify the creation of state governments.
The National League of Cities Court emphasized that such extensive federal
interference with fundamental employment decisions transgressed limitations
placed on the commerce power by the Constitution,3 7 and threatened the states'
separate existence.38 In contrast to the majority, Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, advocated a balancing approach in which the federal interest
and the need for state compliance would be weighed against the states'
sovereignty.3 9 Neither the majority nor Justice Blackmun, however, proposed
standards deliniating acceptable federal interference with state provided serv-

ices.

40

32. Id. at 853. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text. For the view that Justice
Rehnquist's attempt to distinguish Fry was unsuccessful, see Matsumoto, National League of
Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation,
1977 AsIZ. ST. L. REv. 35, 71-72 (1977).
33. 426 U.S. at 853. The Court reasoned that the restrictions reduced, rather than increased, the pressure on the state's budget. Id.
34. Id. at 846. For example, California estimated fire suppression costs would increase
annually by eight to sixteen million dollars. The overtime provisions for time over 40 hours
weekly would have had serious effects on fire departments, because firemen traditionally work
erratic shifts and average their hours from month to month. Id. at 850. California also estimated that it would have to shorten its Highway Patrol training program by more than 50%.
Id. at 846-47. Further, application of the minimum wage provisions was said to make summer
youth employment programs impossible. ld. at 850.
35. Id. at 847.
36. Id. at 851. "Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created to
provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens." Id.
37. Id. at 841. See note 8 supra.
38. Id. at 845. The concern that the federal government could destroy the states'
sovereignty through exercise of the commerce power had been strongly expressed in Justice
Douglas' dissenting opinion in Wirtz eight years earlier. 392 U.S. at 203-05. See generally
Merrill, How to Lose a Federal Republic Without Even Half Trying, 29 OKLA. L. Rxv. 577
(1976); Percy, National League of Cities v. Usery: The Tenth Amendment is Alive and Doing
Well, 51 TULANE L. REV. 95 (1976). However, in an impassioned dissent, Justice Brennan
argued that Congress' reasonable regulation of commerce precluded further judicial review,
that state interests were well represented in Congress, and that the majority decision would
be a usurpation of power from the legislative branch of government. 426 U.S. at 876-78. A
similar view was stated by Chief Justice John Marshall in the seminal case involving the
power of the federal government, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constituional." Id. at 421.
39. 426 U.S. at 856.
40. See Note, supra note 8, at 262. Although Justice Blackmun understood the majority
opinion to adopt a balancing approach, the only suggested criterion is that federal interests
might prevail when state compliance is "essential." 426 U.S. at 856. Because the majority did
not delineate state and federal governmental functions, the dissent argued that the majority
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In holding that the tenth amendment limits the exercise of the commerce
power, the National League of Cities Court expressly declined to determine
whether regulation of state activities would be permissible on other constitutional grounds.41 The Court however, in a footnote alluded to section five of

the fourteenth amendment which empowers Congress to enforce, by appropriate legislation42 equal protection of the law.4 3 In answer to this question left
by National League of Cities, the Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 4 upheld civil rights legislation enacted under section five of the fourteenth amend-

ment prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex or national origin." 4 The Court stated that the fourteenth amendment authorized action against the states which would otherwise be unconstitutional since the amendment was specifically enacted to limit state authority.46
Subsequent to the Court's decisions in National League of Cities and
Fitzpatrick,all but one of the lower federal courts to rule upon the issue have
upheld the application of the Equal Pay Act to the states despite challenges
that it violates state sovereignty.47 These courts have reasoned that the FLSA's
opinion was even less clear on whether the essential nature of the state function or the
magnitude of the threat to the state's independence should be the balancing factor. Id. at 871.
For a discussion of the constitutional priorities of national interests and state sovereignty, see
Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment, 1976
Sup. Cr. REv. 161, 180-81. A more critical analysis of the resurrection of the state sovereignty
doctrine appears in Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery - The Commerce Power and
State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1115 (1978). The dissent was concerned that
the majority's failure to formulate a meaningful standard to limit federal regulation of state
activities would severely limit Congress' power under the commerce clause. 426 U.S. at 880.
41. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
42. Id. U.S. CoNs-r. amend. XIV, §5 provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
43. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, §1 provides in part: "[N]or shall any State ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
44. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Male employees of the state of Connecticut brought suit under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the state's retirement system discriminated against them on the basis of sex. The state claimed that such a suit was barred by
the eleventh amendment. The Court held that the eleventh amendment would not bar a suit
which was expressly authorized by legislation promulgated under the fourteenth amendment,
which was specifically designed to limit state's rights. Id. at 454-56. See also cases cited note 50
infra.
45. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §703(a), 78 Stat. 255 (codified at-42
U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1976)).
46. 427 U.S. at 456. Congressional power under the fourteenth amendment was delineated
in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), in which the Supreme Court held that "whatever
legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in
view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to
all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the
laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power." 100 U.S. at 345-46. Since the fourteenth amendment was enacted subsequent to the tenth amendment, specifically to limit violations of individual rights by the
states, the courts have not viewed the equal protection clause as limited by the tenth amendment. In contrast, the commerce clause, drafted before the amendments, has often been seen
as restricted by the powers constitutionally reserved to the states. See note 8 supra.
47. Over 45 federal courts have decided this issue. See, e.g., Marshall v. Kent State Univ.,
589 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1978) (Equal Pay Act applicable to state university); Usery v. Edward
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severability clause prevents the decision in National League of Cities from invalidating the Equal Pay Act. 48 However, the lack of standards for evaluating
federal interference with state functions under the commerce power has left
the courts divided with respect to the explicit nature of the constitutional justification for the Act. 49
Courts upholding application of the Equal Pay Act to states have taken two
distinct approaches.5 o Some courts have premised their holdings on the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,s1 regardless of the fact that the
Equal Pay Act was enacted under the commerce clause, and does not mention
53
the fourteenth amendment. 2 In Usery v. Charleston County School District,
an illustrative lower court decision, the Fourth Circuit relying on Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer,5 4 held that because the Equal Pay Act was an anti-discrimination measure, it could be interpreted as a valid exercise of Congress' authority to enact
legislation enforcing the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection. 15 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not address the issue of the validity of
the Act's application under the commerce power.5 8
The second approach, that taken by the court in the instant case, justifies
the application of the Equal Pay Act to the states solely on commerce clause
grounds.17 The instant court utilized the reasoning of Fry-S and distinguished
J. Meyer Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (Equal Pay Act applicable to countyowned hospital); Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.Iowa
1976) (Equal Pay Act applicable to local public school system under commerce clause). See
Note, supra note 8, at 286-87. The one decision holding that the Equal Pay Act is not applicable to states as employers is Howard v. Ward County Hosp., 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976).
In that case the district court awarded damages on an alternate count under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby eliminating the necessity of appeal. Id.
48. See, e.g., Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1978) (Equal Pay Act
applicable to custodians in city public schools); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d
148, 155 (3d Cir. 1976) (Equal Pay Act applicable to male barbers and female beauticians in
county hospital); Nilsen v. Metropolitan Fair & Expo. Auth., 435 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (Equal Pay Act valid under commerce clause).
49. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
50. Several cases upholding the Equal Pay Act on fourteenth amendment grounds are
illustrative of these approaches. See, e.g., Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581
F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978) (equal protection); Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1978) (commerce clause); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th
Cir. 1977) (equal protection); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir.
1976) (equal protection).
51. See, e.g., Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978).
52. See 29 U.S.C. §202 (1976).
53. 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977).
54. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
55. 558 F.2d at 1170. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text. For an argument in
favor of the fourteenth amendment analysis, see Note, supra note 8, at 283.
56. 558 F.2d at 1171. Some courts employing the fourteenth amendment analysis utilized
in Charleston County School Dist. have also addressed the issue of whether the Equal Pay
Act may be justified under the commerce clause as well, but have held that the reasoning of
National League of Cities precludes this as a constitutional basis. See, e.g., Marshall v.
Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978).
57. See, e.g., Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978); Usery v. Dallas
Independent School Dist., 421 F. Supp. IIl (N.D. Tex. 1976); Usery v. Bettendorf Com-
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NationalLeague of Cities.59 The court noted that the National League of Cities
decision was narrowly limited and therefore did not completely bar commerce
clause regulation of state activities.60 Contrasting the Equal Pay Act with
minimum wage and overtime regulations, the instant court found that the
Equal Pay Act did not interfere with the delivery of essential state services or
employer-employee relattionships. 61 Regardless of the application of the Equal
Pay Act, the states remained free to make all "fundamental employment decisions."62 Further, the instant court maintained that the ability to dis-

criminate in payment of wages because of sex was not essential to state's
separate existence. 63 Accordingly, the court held that since the Equal Pay Act
does not infringe on state sovereignty so as to violate the tenth amendment, its
application to the states is a valid exercise of the commerce power.64
In further distinguishing National League of Cities, the instant court observed that the FLSA's severability clause created a presumption of divisibility
among its several provisions.65 The court stated that this presumption was particularly proper with respect to the Equal Pay Act because "it ha[d] its own
legislative history, was added to the Fair Labor Standards Act primarily for
administrative convenience, and effectuate[d] policies different from those
served by the minimum wage law." 68 Thus, the Fifth Circuit rejected appellant's argument that coverage of the Equal Pay Act and minimum wage
provisions were co-extensive.67
The instant court addressed the uncertainties left by National League of
Cities as to what constitutes permissible regulation of essential state services.68
Unlike decisions which avoided the issue by justifying the Equal Pay Act under
the fourteenth amendment, a ground unstated by Congress, 69 the court utilized
munity School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp.
423 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
58. 590 F.2d at 182. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
59. 590 F.2d at 132. In contrast, other courts which have decided this issue have made no
effort to distinguish the effects of the Equal Pay Act on the states from those of the minimum
wage and overtime provisions prohibited in National League of Cities. Instead, they rely

completely on its antidiscrimination purpose. See, e.g., Usery v. Charleston County School
Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977).

60. 590 F.2d at 132. "The limits imposed upon the commerce power when Congress seeks
to apply it to the States are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to
combat a national emergency." 426 U.S. at 868.
61. 590 F.2d at 182. See notes 31-84 supra and accompanying text.
62. 426 U.S. at 851. The financial impact of the Equal Pay Act on state employment was
dismissed as minimal in Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1, 6 n.18 (7th Cir. 1978).
But see Comment, supra note 80, at 671.

68. 590 F.2d at 132. The court stated that "the ability to pay female employees wages less
than those paid to male employees for equal work is not among the 'functions essential to
the] separate and independent existence' of the states." Id.
64. Id.

65. Id. at 181.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 182.
Id. at 181-32. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
590 F.2d at 182.
See, e.g., Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978);

Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.d 1 (7th Cir. 1978); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst.
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the reasoning of National League of Cities to delineate the limitation of the
commerce power.7 0As in NationalLeague of Cities, the instant court evaluated
the extent to which the regulation interfered with state control of traditional
functions.- The court determined that under the present facts, the Equal Pay
Act had minimal financial impact on the state7 2 and resulted in no significant
restructuring of employment relationships. 73 The Supreme Court, however, in
National League of Cities74 concluded that minimum wage and overtime provisions would alter budgets, decrease essential services and force changes in
employment practices.75
In addition, the instant court, as a predicate to determining the validity of
the regulation, implicitly weighed the state's interest in opposing the regulation
against the national interest underlying the enactment.7 6 Therefore the court
justified its decision by determining that the federal policy of preventing sex
7
discrimination outweighed any state interest in paying lower wages to women.
In comparison, the National League of Cities Court determined that states
possess a valid interest in maintaining their essential services and employment
programs.73 Thus, by applying the rationale of NationalLeague of Cities, the
instant court was able to validate the extension of the Equal Pay Act to state
employees under the commerce clause.
Although both the fourteenth amendment and commerce clause approaches
Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court had previously upheld legislation on
constitutional grounds other than those stated by Congress. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971). Since congressional legislation carries with it the presumption of constitutionality, it should be construed as constitutional whenever possible. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492 (1904). "The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save
and not to destroy." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937). See also
Comment, supra note 30, at 678-81.
70. The threshold requirement created by National League of Cities for limiting the
exercise of the commerce power was whether the statute interferes with essential state services. 426 U.S. at 845. In the present case the issue was whether health care and hospitals,
specifically cited as examples of essential state services in National League of Cities were
interfered with by the FLSA. See notes 30 and 31 supra.
71. 590 F.2d at 132. Since federal interference with the state's control of its employment
practices is inevitable, e.g., federal income tax requirements, the questions becomes the degree
to which that control can extend before it threatens the state's independent existence.
72. Id. at 132. See note 63 supra.
73. Id. "The Equal Pay Act leaves the states free to set all substantive terms of employment, provided that men and women receive equal compensation for equal work." Id.
74. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
75. Id. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 132. In Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Tex.
1976) the court explicitly held that commerce clause legislation which disrupts an integral
government function may still be valid "if the State interest is outweighed by a national
policy." Id. at 116. This result was justified on the reasoning of Fry, which the district court
regarded as a balancing of the relative state and federal interests.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals later applied the same test to another Equal Pay
Act case and found that "the city here has no legitimate interest in penalizing a woman for
her sex when she does the same job as a man." Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1,
6 (7th Cir. 1978).
77. 590 F.2d at 132. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
78. 426 U.S. at 845-52. See notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
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support the constitutionality of the application of the Equal Pay Act to the
states, failure to utilize the commerce clause approach has implications
for other regulation of state activities. Those decisions which extend National
League of Cities to the Equal Pay Act or avoid the commerce clause issue by
using grounds unstated by Congress, 7 will undermine the constitutionality of
other commerce clause legislation affecting state governments. The solidification of NationalLeague of Cities as a broad restriction on the commerce power
would seriously impede legislative measures not constitutionally justifiable on
grounds other than the commerce clause.8 0 In contrast, those courts which

employ the analysis of the instant case, while respecting the states' sovereign
rights, will limit the application of National League of Cities within reasonable bounds. By closely defining the criteria used in National League of Cities,
the instant case has provided a framework for balancing state and federal
interests in the regulation of state activities. This approach will buttress the
constitutional foundation of federal legislation implementing important national policies and protect them against invalidation pursuant to challenges
based on state sovereignty.
NIcHoLAs ROCKWELL
79. See, e.g., Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978);
Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 588 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny
County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (8d Cir. 1976).
80. Some commentators have suggested that federal regulation of state activities will be
upheld primarily in cases where the state's activities infringe on the rights of individuals.
See, e.g., Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HAxv. L. REv. 1065, 1103 n.139 (1977); Com-

ment, The Right of the Federal Government to Regulate State Employment Practices, 5
FoRmDnA Urm. L. J. 521 (1977).
Areas such as pollution control and energy conservation involve strong national interests.
Local governments, if protected from federal regulation by the resurrection of the sovereignty
doctrine, could subordinate these interests to political expediency. The Clean Aair Act, 42
U.S.C. §7401 (1978), is an exercise of the commerce power under attack on state sovereignty
grounds since National League of Cities, and federal enforcement of state-drafted antipollution plans have been found to be constitutional. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Carey,
552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (federal mandate to enforce metropolitan transportation control plan constitutional). However, the status of federally drafted
plans imposed on cities is still in doubt. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975)
(EPA not empowered to impose sanctions for failure to regulate private pollution); District
of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (EPA not empowered to require states
to enact statutes regulating pollution by general public). For recent developments in the
conflict between state sovereignty and federal air pollution legislation see generally Note,
Friends of the Earth v. Carey: Enforcing the Clean Air Act, 9 TRANS. L.J. 411 (1977); Note,
Transportation Control Plans Under the Clear (sic) Air Act of 1970: Cooperative Federalism

Meets Its Ultimate Challenge, 4 Oio N.L. REv, 632 (1977); Comment, Constitutional Law Interstate Commerce -Federal Regulations Requiring States to Enact Statutes Enforcing
FederalAir Pollution ControlProgramsExceed the Commerce Power by Intruding Upon State
Sovereignty Protected by the Tenth Amendment, 29 VAND. L. Rv. 276 (1976). The courts

have recognized Congress' authority to regulate the states as polluters when state owned facilities are the direct producers of pollution. See, e.g., State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559
F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977) (publicly owned sewage treatment plant subject to Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972).
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